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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 The euro area sovereign debt crisis has been exacerbated by an on-going euro area 
banking problem and the sovereign debt crisis has worsened the prospects for euro 
area banks. As sovereign spreads rise, so do concerns about counterparty risk. This 
makes it urgent that euro area policy makers find a solution to the problem of 
dealing with troubled financial institutions. 
 When confronted with the insolvency of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there 
were only three possible options for policy makers: attempting to use conventional 
bankruptcy legislation to support or wind down the firm; using taxpayers’ funds to 
prop up the ailing institution; or finding another institution to buy the failed firm. 
Each of these options has serious drawbacks. 
 In thinking about how to structure a bank resolution regime, it is useful to consider 
what regimes are now in place elsewhere. I describe the experience of the United 
States in handling the failure of relatively simple depository financial institutions. 
 When a financial institution fails, many parties have claims against its assets. There 
is wide agreement that if the firm’s assets are insufficient to meet these claims, that 
the depositors should be protected, at least up to a point, and that the shareholders 
should lose their money. There is less agreement over whether or not other 
claimants should be protected and whether society or other financial institutions 
should fund any shortfall.  
 There is a conflict between efficiency and property rights in the design of bank 
resolution regimes. If a financial firm’s business is to continue without interruption, 
it is best to take it over before it becomes insolvent. But, if the firm has not yet 
failed then there may be a chance that it might not fail and in this case seizing it 
amounts to confiscation.  
 One of the most important and challenging problems in designing a bank resolution 
mechanism is how to deal with multinational banks. An international banking 
group’s foreign branches are subject to the resolution regime of the country in which 
the group is licensed. Its foreign subsidiaries, however, are subject to the resolution 
mechanism of their host country. Conflicts between these regimes have the 
potential to be disastrous. 
 The European Commission is addressing the problem posed by systemically 
important financial institutions, with the goal of ensuring that these firms can be 
allowed to fail without creating significant risk to financial stability or costs to 
taxpayers. Its 20 October 2011 communication is a careful and sensible assessment 
of the challenge.  
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE BANKING CRISIS AND SOVEREIGN 
DEBT 
The euro area sovereign debt crisis has been exacerbated by an on-going euro area banking 
problem. For example, the Greek sovereign debt crisis has been described as a German and 
French banking crisis in disguise: the heavy exposure of German and French banks to Greek 
debt may have precluded an otherwise desirable pre-emptive rescheduling by the Greek 
government. An imprudent sovereign guarantee of unsecured Irish bank debt, followed by 
recapitalisation and nationalisation of Irish banks that were far too big to bail out led to the 
Irish sovereign debt crisis. The sovereign debt crisis in turn worsens the prospects for euro 
area banks. As sovereign spreads rise, so do concerns about counterparty risk. This leads to 
higher bank funding costs and the credit rationing associated with adverse selection 
problems. Thus, both as way of dealing with a sovereign debt crisis and because the 
sovereign debt crisis has made the problem of failing banks more urgent, euro area policy 
makers must find a solution to the problem of dealing with troubled financial institutions. 
 
In this report, I consider how policy makers initially responded to the problem of failed 
financial institutions in the solvency crisis that began in the summer of 2008. I describe 
how they relied on conventional bankruptcy legislation, taxpayer-funded bailouts and 
selling troubled firms. The United States has operated an efficient bank resolution regime 
for relatively uncomplicated depository institutions. As this provides lessons for the EU, I 
also describe how it functions and assess its limitations and problems. Finally, I discuss 
how, in light of the experiences with different methods during the financial crisis and the 
United States’ experience, one might design a bank resolution regime for Europe. 
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2. OPTIONS POLICY MAKERS HAD FOR DEALING WITH 
FAILED BANKS IN THE CURRENT CRISIS 
A problem associated with the financial sector is that, because of systemic risk factors, the 
demise of just one or a few sufficiently important financial institutions can lead to the 
domino-like collapse of a chain of other financial institutions that severely impairs an entire 
national, or even the global, financial sector. Because of the importance of the financial 
system to the real economy’s functioning, this could be a damaging or even catastrophic 
blow to the real economy. Unfortunately, the eruption of the solvency crisis has made it 
clear how unprepared the world was to deal with the collapse of large, systemically 
important financial firms. 
When confronted with the insolvency of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there were 
only three possible options for policy makers: attempting to use conventional bankruptcy 
legislation to support or wind down the firm; using taxpayers’ funds to prop up the ailing 
institution; finding another institution to buy the failed firm. Each of these options has 
serious drawbacks. 
2.1. Using Conventional Insolvency Laws 
Conventional bankruptcy legislation is too slow to be suitable for financial firms and 
multinational firms face problems associated with different and conflicting bankruptcy 
regimes in different locales. These problems are illustrated by experience of Lehman 
Brothers.1 
Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on 15 September 2008. At 
Lehman, it was procedure that all spare cash held by the London subsidiary – a corporate 
entity subject to British bankruptcy legislation – was sent to the New York parent at the 
close of each business day. When the directors of this subsidiary realised on Sunday 
14 September 2008 that their US parent was going to file for bankruptcy protection the 
next day, they realised they no longer had the cash to fund their operations. Under British 
law this meant that the company had to be put into administration and, as a consequence, 
its access to exchanges and clearing systems was frozen with a large number of trades left 
open.  
Putting the British subsidiary into administration also created a further problem. The British 
subsidiary used a bewildering array of complex legal structures to hold its client assets. The 
Lehman Brothers group had a group-wide IT system that was operated out of New York 
and, after the bankruptcy filing, it ceased to be updated for the British subsidiary. This 
made it difficult for the administrators to return the client assets – worth about USD 35 
billion – held by this subsidiary. The resulting delay greatly increased the market disruption 
caused by the failure of Lehman Brothers. 
                                                 
1 See Armour (2010) for a detailed description. 
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2.2. Taxpayer-Funded Bailouts 
The second option for dealing with failed financial firms, bailouts with tax payer funds, has 
been used by many countries since the recent crisis began. Examples are the United States 
in the case of American International Group (AIG), Germany in the case of Hypo Real and 
Commerzbank, the United Kingdom in the case of the Royal Bank of Scotland Group and 
the TSB-HBOS Group, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg in the case of Fortis Bank 
and Ireland in the case of Anglo Irish Bank.  
There are a number of potential problems with this approach. The first is that it might 
create moral hazard. If financial firms perceive that they are likely to be bailed out if they 
run into difficulties then this would tend to cause them to engage in excessively risky 
behaviour. On the other hand, if the market also believes that insolvent financial firms are 
likely to be bailed out, then these firms can borrow at more favourable rates than they 
otherwise could. This raises the value of solvency and might, in principle, mitigate this 
problem to some extent. However, a recent study of German banks during the period 
1996 – 2006 does not support this. It was found that the removal of public guarantees 
significantly reduced risk taking.2  
The second problem is that tax payer bailouts can also be politically unpopular, to say the 
least. In Ireland, parties campaigning against the continued use of tax payers’ money to 
repay the senior unsecured bondholders of Irish banks gained a large majority in the Irish 
parliamentary elections of 25 February 2011.  
A third problem is that, in some instances, the failed banks are too large for tax payer 
bailouts to be feasible. Iceland is the most egregious case; the size of the Icelandic banking 
sector’s balance sheet was about 11 times the size of Icelandic GDP before it collapsed. 
Fortunately, the Icelandic government did not attempt to save its banks, as this would have 
dragged the sovereign into insolvency along with the banks. The Irish attempt at bailing 
out banks that were too big to be saved is now threatening sovereign solvency.  
Finally, state support of financial institutions may conflict with Article 107(1) of the Treaty 
on European Union (consolidated version) which says, ‘Save as otherwise provided in the 
Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form 
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between 
Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.’ However, Article 107(3)(b) may 
provide an exception in sufficiently important cases as it allows aid ‘to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State’. 
2.3. Selling Troubled Firms 
The third approach to the threatened bankruptcy of a financial firm has been to sell it to or 
merge it with another financial firm. Fortis’s Belgian banking operations were sold to the 
French bank BNP Paribas (while its Dutch ABN-Amro operations were sold to the Dutch 
sovereign), Merrill Lynch was sold to the Bank of America, Bear Stearns was merged with 
JP Morgan Chase, HBOS was acquired by Lloyds TSB. 
                                                 
2 See Gropp et al (2010). 
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This approach, too, has problems. It may require a taxpayer sweetener (as in the case of 
Bear Stearns) to induce another firm to go along with the deal. Negotiations can be 
acrimonious (as in the case of Fortis) and take time. Shareholders may try to block the deal 
if it lowers the value of their shares or reduces their control (as they did at Fortis and JP 
Morgan). It may weaken the institution that acquires the failed firm. Lloyds TSB share 
values fell by about a third in value after HBOs posted unexpectedly high losses in early 
2009. Some financial firms, such as the Royal Bank of Scotland, are too large to be 
digested by another. 
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3. THE BANK RESOLUTION REGIME IN THE UNITED STATES 
In thinking about how to structure a bank resolution regime, it is useful to consider what 
regimes are now in place elsewhere. I describe some of the experience of the United States 
in handling failed depository financial institutions. 
3.1. The Case of the FDIC and Washington Mutual 
Washington Mutual (WaMu) of Seattle was the sixth largest bank in the United States, with 
assets valued at USD 328 billion in 2007. Unfortunately, it suffered heavy losses in the US 
subprime mortgage market and the price of its shares plummeted from 30 dollars to two 
dollars between September 2007 and September 2008. On 15 September 2008 its 
depositors began to run, withdrawing about USD 17 billion. On Thursday 25 September the 
US Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), which regulated WaMu, closed the bank and 
appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver.3 The FDIC 
auctioned off a package including most of the WaMu’s assets and all of its deposits and 
secured debt. On Thursday 25 September 2008, JP Morgan Chase was informed that it was 
the winner.  
The collapse of WaMu was the largest bank failure in US history and the second largest 
bankruptcy after Lehman Brothers. However, unlike in the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
WaMu’s business operations proceeded without interruption after its demise. Its branches 
opened as usual on the morning of Friday 26 September, albeit as JP Morgan branches, its 
ATMs continued to operate and its online services remained available. 
In the United States the FDIC manages a receivership regime for failed banks. It sells their 
good assets and winds down their bad assets. It currently insures up to USD 250,000 per 
depositor per bank. If there are more than sufficient funds to pay insured depositors from a 
bank’s recovered assets, then it uses the extra funds to pay, in order, general unsecured 
creditors, subordinated debt and stockholders. If there are insufficient funds to pay insured 
depositors, then it makes up the difference with its Deposit Insurance Fund. A 27 February 
2009 press release from the FDIC states: ‘Throughout the FDIC's 75-year history, no 
depositor has ever lost a penny of insured deposits. While deposits insured by the FDIC are 
backed by the full faith and credit of the United States Government, the FDIC is funded not 
with taxpayer money but with deposit insurance premiums imposed on banks. Though the 
FDIC has the authority to borrow from the Treasury Department to meet its obligations, it 
has never done so to cover losses.’ 
3.2. Limitations of and Problems with the American System 
While the FDIC’s demonstrated operational efficiency in the handling of failed depository 
institutions is enviable, the tasks of the FDIC have been much easier than the ones 
potentially facing European authorities. WaMu was a big bank by American standards, but it 
was small compared to behemoths such as BNP Paribas or Royal Bank of Scotland which 
have assets worth three trillion dollars or more. Moreover, and crucially, WaMu was a 
domestic corporation with a relatively uncomplicated balance sheet.  
                                                 
3 The OTS is no more; its rights and responsibilities have been taken over by the Federal Reserve, the FDIC and 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. 
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The plain vanilla depository institutions that are resolved by the FDIC have not had 
complex contingent claims on their balance sheets and they have not combined principal 
and agent roles in their transactions, as do the US broker-dealers that act as custodians 
and clearing agencies in OTC transactions as well as transacting in the same securities on 
their own accounts. They have not had complex cross-border structures of branches and 
subsidiaries and, thus, they have not had the coordination and technical problems 
associated with multinational groups with corporate entities located in several jurisdictions. 
The FDIC’s operational efficiency may also have come at the expense of property rights. On 
20 March 2009 the shareholders of WaMu, who were nearly wiped out in the FDIC’s sale of 
WaMu to JP Morgan Chase, filed suit against the FDIC. They are seeking damages for what 
they view as the unjustified seizure of the institution and its sale at an unreasonably low 
price. 
Until recently, the FDIC’s authority has been limited to depository institutions; this is why 
Lehman Brothers fell outside of its scope. This has been changed, however, with the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 21 July 
2010. This Act extends the reach of the FDIC to financial companies whose potential 
collapse might jeopardise the financial stability of the United States. That a financial firm 
presents sufficient systemic risk is to be determined by the US Treasury in consultation 
with the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC. Necessary funding is to be provided by an 
Orderly Liquidation Fund that is to be set up by collecting risk-based assessment fees from 
eligible financial companies. The fees are to be adjusted as necessary so that any 
borrowing from the Treasury is repaid within five years and, thus, no taxpayer money is 
used. Claims against assets are largely the same order as in the regime for depository 
institutions, but the compensation claims of all senior executives are subordinate to those 
of all junior creditors.  
Unfortunately, however, the problem of multiple jurisdictions is not addressed: the Act does 
not apply to foreign subsidiaries. It is also not entirely credible that the United States has 
committed itself to never using taxpayer money. 
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4. DESIGNING A BANK RESOLUTION REGIME 
Coming up with a proposal for how to respond to the actual or threatened insolvency of 
financial firms involves answering three questions. First, who should bear the cost of the 
institution’s failure or restructuring? Second, increasing a resolution regime’s operational 
efficiency limits systemic risk, but potentially at the expense of trampling on property 
rights. How much efficiency does society want and what is the least costly way to get it? 
Third, how can society resolve the problem of financial institutions operating in multiple 
jurisdictions? 
4.1. Who should bear the cost of a bank failure? 
When a financial institution fails, many parties have claims against its assets: its workers 
and suppliers, tax authorities, depositors, secured debt holders, senior debt holders, junior 
debt holders and shareholders. There is wide agreement that if the assets are insufficient to 
meet these claims, that the depositors should be protected, at least up to a point, and that 
the shareholders should lose their money. There is less agreement over whether or not 
other claimants should be protected and if so whether society or other financial institutions 
should foot the bill. 
There are two reasons for protecting deposit holders. The first reason is a fragility 
argument. That is, there exists a possible and socially costly equilibrium supported by self-
fulfilling expectations: each depositor runs in the belief that all other depositors will run and 
the bank will fail. If depositors are insured uninterrupted access to their funds in the event 
of a bank failure, then there is no incentive for them to run. The second reason is that it 
may be unreasonable to expect small depositors to monitor the health of complex financial 
organisations, and hence, they should be protected.  
The fragility argument may also be extended to the other creditors of a bank (or other 
financial firm). Here too there is a socially costly equilibrium where each non-depositor 
creditor fails to extend new loans or roll over existing loans in the belief that all other such 
creditors are going to refuse to grant new loans and withdraw the old. In addition, there is 
an argument based on asymmetric information problems. If creditors cannot perfectly 
gauge the solvency of banks there may be an adverse selection problem that causes credit 
markets to freeze. Insuring creditors solves this adverse selection problem.4  
If it is accepted that some bondholders should be protected, the question is where to draw 
the line. It has been argued strongly (although mainly by senior bondholders and their 
lawyers) that senior bondholders should be protected. The argument is that, unlike equity 
holders, senior bondholders have no possibility of an upside gain, thus they should not be 
exposed to downside risk. If they were exposed to such risk then they would require higher 
interest rates. If the banks were forced to pay higher interest rates, they would then pass 
this cost on to their consumers. As a result, households would pay more for their 
mortgages and other loans. In addition, it is claimed, senior bondholders are not typically 
hedge funds, but insurance companies and pensions funds. If senior bonds become more 
risky, so do these funds. 
                                                 
4 The fragility argument does not necessarily require insurance. The existence of a fully credible lender of last 
resort is an alternative. 
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These arguments, however, are partial equilibrium in nature and neglect the moral hazard 
problem that arises when creditors believe that they will be bailed out. If, instead, it is 
believed that senior bonders would be expected to take significant haircuts in the event of 
insolvency, then they would have an incentive to become more selective about which bonds 
they purchase. Both they and society, because it cares about the health of pension and 
insurance funds, would become more careful about monitoring the behaviour of the issuers 
of the bonds. Consequently, financial institutions that want to issue senior bonds would 
have an incentive to become more transparent and to engage in less risky behaviour. To 
the extent that less risk taking on the part of financial institutions is desirable and worth 
the higher monitoring costs, these changes might offset the harm of the increases in the 
banks’ costs are passed on to their customers. In addition, it is clear that in the event of 
the failure of a sufficiently large bank, protecting all senior bond holders may simply not be 
feasible.  
A legal system that protects some creditors – say some deposit holders and some secured 
debtors – but leaves open the question of how much of a haircut unsecured debtors are 
expected to take, leads to increased uncertainty, litigation and acrimony. A partial solution 
to a lack of political will to clarify matters is for financial institutions to issue securities that 
are clearly not protected. An example is a contingent convertible bond, or Coco. Such 
bonds vary in nature, but the ones that are relevant here are bonds which are 
automatically converted into equity at a pre-specified price when some trigger point is 
reached. The Basel Committee wants the regulators to decide when the trigger point is 
reached. While this gives regulators flexibility in dealing with novel situations, it does away 
with one of the main advantages of Cocos: the rules of the game are clear to all in 
advance. An attractive alternative may be one where the conversion is triggered by some 
readily observable and verifiable event. Credit Suisse, Rabobank and Lloyds have all issued 
Cocos that are triggered if their Tier-1 capital falls below some specified level. 
If a failed financial firm’s assets are insufficient to protect the claimants that society wishes 
to protect then the question of who should cover a shortfall arises. This amounts to a 
choice between the taxpayers and the financial services industry. It is not necessary to 
point out the political implications of taxpayer-funded bailouts. In the United States, the 
recently passed Dodd-Frank act specifically precludes spending taxpayer money to rescue a 
systemically important institution. Taking the more realistic view that there may be 
instances where some public funding is inevitable, the UK Banking Act of 2009 allows for 
this. 
It is generally accepted that the owners, creditors or customers of the financial services 
industry should pay at least some of the short fall. In addition to being popular with 
taxpayers, this might lessen the moral hazard problem associated with bailouts, especially 
in countries with just a few large financial firms. If financial institutions provide the funding, 
then they have an incentive to monitor each other.  
Funds could be collected by taxing institutions (and possibly deposit holders or other 
insured creditors) either ex post or ex ante. The EU has favoured an ex ante approach. In 
this case the payment can be viewed as an involuntary insurance payment that is collected 
from financial firms and it might depend upon readily measurable features that indicate its 
size or contribute to its riskiness.  
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The United States has favoured an ex post approach. In this case the payment is not 
insurance, but a tax. If Bank A fails, it is widely perceived as fair that the shareholders and 
the uninsured creditors should lose their money before the taxpayers step in to pay off the 
insured creditors. It is not, however, reasonable that Bank B, whose managers behaved 
prudently and which did not fail, should also be assessed before the taxpayers. It is fair to 
tax financial institutions and their customers for the provision of insurance, but if 
reasonable ex ante insurance payments and recovered assets do not cover the insured 
creditors of a failed financial institution then it is the tax payers who are the natural 
candidates to contribute.  
The current banking crisis is to a large extent the result of supervisory and regulatory 
failures, as well as governments’ policy blunders. In a democratic society, the ultimate 
responsibility for much of the crisis then lies with the electorate. In addition to fairness 
issues, if the failure of an institution causes significant systemic risk and other financial 
firms must contribute to making up the loss, then it forces financial firms to lose liquidity 
just when they need it. 
4.2. Shareholder Rights vs. Efficiency 
Earlier in this essay I extolled the efficiency of the US resolution regime in its handling of 
WaMu. But, there are those (primarily the shareholders and bondholders of WaMu) who tell 
a different story. In their version of events, WaMu had been searching for a buyer since 
early September 2008. On 25 September the FDIC announced that JP Morgan Chase had 
won an auction to buy the bank. This suggests that the FDIC must have alerted potential 
purchasers that the bank was going to be seized some time before the sale. This made it 
impossible for WaMu to find a buyer: why buy a bank from its shareholders and be required 
to take on all of its liabilities when you can purchase select parts of it in a government-run 
fire sale? The resulting rumours could well have provoked the bank run. The bondholders 
and shareholders have also argued that WaMu was solvent and might have remained so; 
that the FDIC provoked its liquidity crisis and the subsequent seizure amounted to 
confiscation. 
The different spins on the handling of WaMu result from the conflict between efficiency and 
property rights that is inherent in the design of bank resolution regimes. Such regimes 
could in principle rely on statute, and thus spell out the rules of the game in advance, 
promoting fairness and protecting the rights of property owners. Or, they can rely on the 
discretion of regulators, and thus allow the necessary flexibility to deal with previously 
unforeseen events.  
That trade-off between property rights and efficiency is especially acute when it comes to 
deciding how to determine when a financial firm can be taken over by the government. To 
insure that a financial firm’s business continues without interruption, it is best to take it 
over before it becomes insolvent. But, if the firm has not yet failed, then there may be a 
chance that it might not fail and in this case, seizing it amounts to confiscation. 
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The problem is further complicated by the problem that it can be difficult to assess whether 
or not a financial firm is solvent or likely to become so. In principle, insolvency occurs when 
the firm is no longer operationally viable in the sense that it is unlikely to be able to repay 
its debts. If solvency is defined this way, however, then declaring a firm to be insolvent 
requires the judgement of the regulators.  
There are more mechanical definitions that rely less on judgement. Three alternative 
possible criteria for insolvency are when the firm has negative net worth under the 
prevailing accepted accounting principles; when the firm would have a negative net value if 
it were liquidated; when the firm no longer has enough liquidity to continue to pay its bills.5 
However, these criteria can be unreliable and unreasonable during a financial crisis where 
markets become dysfunctional and the price that one could get for a financial asset can be 
far below its reasonably expected discounted present value if it were held to maturity. 
Consequently, it is probably unrealistic to rely on a rules-based approach to determining 
which financial firms should be taken over. Instead, regulators must be allowed to use their 
discretion, even though this entails a loss of security of property rights and, hence, possibly 
of government legitimacy. Shareholders, however, should have the opportunity to contest 
the regulators’ actions ex post in court.  
EU law provides stronger protection for bank shareholders than does US law. Under current 
EU law, shareholders of firms must vote on acquisitions and mergers and on whether or not 
the company is to be liquidated.6 However, during the financial crisis, a need to avoid 
systemic risk has led some nations to suspend these shareholder rights for financial firms. 
In the United Kingdom, the Banking Act of 2009 gives the Treasury and the Bank of 
England wide powers to transfer shares from a failing bank to a government-owned bridge 
bank or to a private purchaser.  
4.3. Problems Associated with Multinational Banks 
One of the most important and challenging problems in designing a bank resolution 
mechanism is how to deal with multinational banks. An international banking group’s foreign 
branches are subject to the resolution regime of the country in which the group is licensed. 
Its foreign subsidiaries, however, are subject to the resolution mechanism of their host 
country. As the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy illustrates, conflicts between these mechanisms 
have the potential to be disastrous.7 
In addition to legal issues there are technical problems associated with the restructuring of a 
systemically important multinational financial institution. For example, how does one transfer 
such a complicated organisation to new ownership over a weekend so that its operations are 
unaffected? These technical issues are behind the proposals for all systemically significant 
cross-border institutions to have resolution plans or ‘living wills’. 
                                                 
5 See Hempton (2009) for a discussion of this. 
6 See Kern (2009). 
7 It might seem that a possible solution would be to make foreign subsidiaries branches, but many countries 
dislike the notion that a financial institution located within their borders is regulated and supervised by a foreign 
nation: the Icesave debacle illustrates why this is so. 
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5. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION RESPONSE 
The European Commission is addressing the problem posed by systemically important 
financial institutions with the goal of ensuring that these firms can be allowed to fail without 
creating significant risk to financial stability or costs to taxpayers. Its 20 October 2011 
communication is a careful and sensible assessment of the challenge. It recommends 
national resolution regimes with well-defined powers and processes, safeguards for the 
property rights of creditors and resolution plans for financial groups that ‘would require detail 
on group structure, intragroup guarantees and service level agreements, contracts and 
counterparties, debt liabilities, custody arrangements, as well as operational information 
about IT systems and human resources.’ It recognises the difficulties in specifying when the 
resolution mechanism for a firm is to be triggered. It discusses the design and use of 
resolution funds. A formal proposal will be made by the Commission in the spring of 2011. 
The most serious problem the Commission faces is dealing with cross-border groups. Without 
a harmonised European resolution regime and a single European regulator, there is no 
perfect way of dealing with systemically important financial groups with corporate entities in 
multiple European countries. The existence of financial groups with corporate entities both 
inside and outside Europe further complicates the issue. 
The Commission has made two recommendations for dealing with financial groups operating 
in multiple EU countries. The first is that ‘resolution colleges’ should be established for 
financial groups. These colleges would be chaired by the resolution authority responsible for 
the group’s parent company and would include the resolution authorities responsible for the 
group’s other corporate entities. Such colleges would provide a forum for exchanging 
information and discussing coordinated solutions. This appears to be a useful and relatively 
non-controversial idea, if limited in scope. 
The second recommendation is more controversial. Under this recommendation, the relevant 
authorities – presumably the resolution colleges – would prepare a group resolution plan in 
advance. In the event of the failure of the group, the resolution authority responsible for the 
group’s parent company would have the right to decide whether the group resolution scheme 
is appropriate or whether national resolution regimes would be preferable. This decision 
would have to be made quickly, but until made the authorities responsible for the group’s 
other corporate entities would be required to refrain from implementing national measures 
that would threaten the group resolution scheme. It is unclear whether such a scheme is 
currently politically feasible. 
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